Преступная сеть. Как хакинг вышел на мировой уровень: от вирусов до вмешательства в выборы - Джефф Уайт

www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk, проверено 29.06.2019.

296

Krebs B. Did the Mirai Botnet Really Take Liberia Offline? // Krebs on Security, www.krebsonsecurity.com, 04.11.2016.

297

‘International Hacker-for-hire Jailed for Cyber Attacks on Liberian Telecommunications Provider’, National Crime Agency.

298

Ibid.

299

Mattijs Jonker, Alistair King, Johannes Krupp, Christian Rossow, Anna Sperotto and Alberto Dainotti, ‘Millions of Targets under Attack: A Macroscopic Characterization of the DOS Ecosystem’, Proceedings of IMC ’17, 01–03.11.2017.

300

Kaspersky E. «The Man Who Found Stuxnet – Sergey Ulasen in the Spotlight» Nota Bene, Notes, Comment and Buzz from Eugene Kaspersky // official blog, www.eugene.kaspersky.com, 02.11.2011.

301

Например, правительство США с 1992 года придерживается «презумпции отказа» на экспорт программного обеспечения в Иран (‘Iran Sanctions’, RS20871, Congressional Research Service, обновлено 04.02.2019).

302

См.: www.zerodium.com, проверено 29.06.2019.

303

‘Tor Browser Bounty’, www.zerodium.com, 13.09.2017.

304

См.: www.twitter.com/Zerodium, проверено 25.05.2019.

305

O’Murchu L. Stuxnet Using Three Additional Zero-day Vulnerabilities // Symantec Official Blog. www.symantec.com, 14.09.2010.

306

Kaspersky E. The Man Who Found Stuxnet.

307

‘Rootkit.TmpHider’, VirusBlokAda, www.anti-virus.by, 17.06.2010.

308

Ibid.

309

Пользователь frank_boldewin, www.wildersecurity.com, 14.07.2010.

310

Falliere N., O Murchu L., Chien E. W32. Stuxnet DossierVersion 1.4 // Symantec Security Response. February 2011. P. 2.

311

Langner R. To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s Creators Tried to Achieve // Langner Group (November 2013).

312

‘Country Analysis Briefs – Iran’, U. S. Energy Information Administration (09.04.2018). Р. 1.

313

‘Country Analysis Briefs – Iran’, U. S. Energy Information Administration (16.04.2010). Р. 5.

314

«Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran – Report by the Director General» // International Atomic Energy Agency. 06.06.2003. P. 2.

315

‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran – Report by the Director General’ // International Atomic Energy Agency. 15.11.2004. P. 9. Инспекторы признали, что следы высокообогащенного урана могли появиться из-за загрязнения при импорте оборудования.

316

Linzer D. Iran Was Offered Nuclear Parts // Washington Post. 27.02.2005.

317

Falliere N., O Murchu L., Chien E. W32. Stuxnet DossierVersion 1.4. P. 5.

318

Zetter K. Countdown to Zero Day. New York, 2014. P. 222.

319

Stuxnet Patient Zero: First Victims of the Infamous Worm Revealed // Kaspersky Lab. www.kaspersky.com, 11.11.2014. Р.2.

320

BroadW. J. A Tantalizing Look at Iran’s Nuclear Program // New York Times. 29.04.2008.

321

Langner R. To Kill a Centrifuge. P.12.

322

Zetter K. Countdown to Zero Day. P. 3.

323

Langner R. To Kill a Centrifuge. P. 10.

324

Zetter K., Modderkolk H. Revealed: How a Secret Dutch Mole Aided the U. S. – Israeli Stuxnet Cyberattack on Iran // Yahoo! News, news.yahoo.com. 02.09.2019.

325

‘Stuxnet 0.5: How It Evolved’ // Symantec Security Response. 26.02.2013.

326

Zetter K. Countdown to Zero Day. P.333.

327

Ibid. P. 238.

328

Ibid. P. 359–62.

329

Langner R. To Kill a Centrifuge. P. 15.

330

Santos N. BlackEnergy APT Malware // RSA NetWitness Platform, www.community.rsa.com, 23.03.2016.

331

Hultquist J. Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks // FireEye Threat Research, www.fireeye.com, 07.01.2016.

332

‘General Assembly Adopts Resolution Urging Russian Federation to Withdraw Its Armed Forces from Crimea, Expressing Grave Concern about Rising Military Presence’, United Nations General Assembly Plenary Seventy-third Session, 56th Meeting (PM), 17.12.2018.

333

‘Cybercrime BlackEnergy2 / 3: The History of Attacks on Critical IT Infrastructure of Ukraine’, CyS Centrum, www.cys-centrum.com, 06.01.2016.

334

Styczynski J., Beach-Westmoreland N., Stables S. When the Lights Went Out: A Comprehensive Review of the 2015 Attacks on Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure // Booz Allen Hamilton. September 2016. P. 14.

335

Barak I., Rustici R. ICS Threat Broadens: Nation-State Hackers Are No Longer the Only Game in Town // Cybereason, www.cybereason.com, 07.08.2018.

336

Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid // Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Centre, www.eisac.com, 18.03.2016, p. 4.

337

Zetter K. Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid // Wired. 03.03.2016.

338

Styczynski J., Beach-Westmoreland N., Stables S. When the Lights Went Out. Р. 20–21.

339

Ibid. Р. 21.

340

Ibid. Р. 22.

341

Greenberg A. How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar // Wired. 20.06.2017.

342

Ibid.

343

‘Міністерство енергетики та вугільної промисловості України’ («Министерство энергетики и угольной промышленности Украины»), www.pe.kmu.gov.ua, 12.02.2016.

344

Santos N. BlackEnergy APT Malware.

345

Greenberg A.